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Abstract 
Local governments often set up inter-municipal consortia to provide public services jointly, rather than 
individually. The main benefits of joint provision include the potential for improved cost-effectiveness 
arising from gains from economies of scale and the internalisation of costs and/or benefits of provision, 
which could otherwise spill over inter-municipal borders and discourage provision. To shed further light on 
this issue, this paper tests for the presence of scale and spillover effects in local government provision and 
estimates the determinants of the probability of local government participation in inter-municipal consortia 
in Brazil and Spain. Empirical evidence suggests that in some cases smaller jurisdictions operate at sub-
optimal scale and are indeed more likely than their larger counterparts to participate in inter-municipal 
consortia. In the case of Brazil, governance arrangements between the municipalities and the state 
governments and/or private-sector providers, but not the federal government, are also associated with a 
higher probability of participation in inter-municipal consortia, suggesting the presence of “participation 
spillovers” among governance arrangements.                
JEL Classification Codes: H72, H77, H75 
Keywords: inter-municipal cooperation, local public finance, Brazil, Spain, federalism, probit 
                                                     
1
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Reform”, to take place on 29-30 September 2011 in A Coruña, Spain. The authors are indebted to the 
conference participants, in particular Germà Bel, Brian Dollery, Ana Herrero, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 
Francisco Pedraja and Francois Vaillancourt, for helpful comments and discussions, but remain solely 
responsible for any remaining errors and omissions. The opinions and analyses presented in this paper do 
not necessarily reflect those of the OECD or the Organisation’s member or partner countries. Santiago 
Lago-Peñas acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
(ECO2010-15553). 
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1 Introduction  
Local governments around the world strive to meet residents’ demands for goods and services in a 
cost-effective manner. Where local governments are small, they may be unable to exploit economies of 
scale in the production and delivery of services. At the same time, if the benefits of local provision spill 
over inter-jurisdictional borders while provision costs are internalised by local taxpayers, local 
governments may be discouraged from provision in the first place, which results in an undesirable, sub-
optimal supply of services. One option for dealing with these difficulties is to consolidate local 
governments into larger units that would allow for scale effects to be maximised and benefit spillovers to 
be internalised within the providing jurisdiction. However, consolidations are often difficult to achieve, 
especially due to political resistance to mergers and amalgamations. Indeed, they may even be undesirable, 
if they run counter to the objective of bringing the government closer to the people, which usually 
facilitates social control over government operations and allows for information over local preferences and 
needs to be extracted more efficiently.  
An alternative to consolidation is the establishment of flexible governance structures at the local level 
that allow for joint provision while maintaining jurisdictional autonomy. This is the case, for example, of 
the inter-municipal consortia that are currently in place in many countries and allow neighbouring local 
governments to set up – most often on a voluntary basis – single- or multiple-purpose agencies and/or local 
enterprises to provide local services to residents of different jurisdictions. The legal and institutional 
underpinnings of these consortia vary considerably among and sometimes even within countries.  
Rather than taking stock of the different arrangements in place around the world, the objective of this 
paper is to shed light on the determinants of participation in inter-municipal consortia in Brazil and Spain. 
The cases of Brazil and Spain are instructive for a number of reasons. First, both countries are highly 
decentralised, and the sub-national governments are at the forefront of service delivery. The local 
authorities therefore have strong incentives to seek innovative solutions to common problems in an 
environment of strong support for local self-governance. Second, in both countries the local governments 
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(municipalities) have considerable experience with joint provision through inter-municipal consortia. For 
example, nearly 41% of Brazil’s municipalities with population above 5 000 inhabitants participate in such 
consortia for the provision of health care, and nearly 27% of Spanish municipalities with population above 
5 000 inhabitants do so for the provision of social services, including old-age care and support for the 
disabled, immigrants and ethnic minorities, among other services. Consortia are also in place in Brazil for 
education, culture, urban development, transport and other services under the purview of local 
governments. Spanish municipalities also cooperate for the treatment of solid waste collection, waste water 
treatment and transport. Third, in both countries the municipalities participate in cooperative ventures with 
higher levels of government and private-sector providers, which provide a wealth of horizontal and vertical 
governance arrangements for local provision.
2
  To our knowledge, this is the first study in the empirical 
literature to estimate the drivers of inter-municipal cooperation for the provision of local services in Spain.  
We estimate the determinants of unit provision costs for a cross-section of Brazilian and Spanish 
municipalities, measured as per capita local government spending on a variety of local services, and in turn 
the drivers of participation in inter-municipal consortia using a probit model that takes into account the 
endogeneity of unit provision costs. The fact that high unit provision costs may encourage participation in 
consortia and that participation may drive such costs down would create a reverse causality bias that needs 
to be addressed in the estimations. Unit provision costs are subject to scale effects and depend on a variety 
of local government characteristics, such as population density, socio-economic factors and spatial effects.  
The main findings of the empirical analysis are as follows.  
 The provision of at least some local services exhibit scale and/or spatial spillover effects in both 
Brazil and Spain. The socio-economic characteristics of local communities, as well as population 
                                                     
2
  For simplicity, we use the term inter-municipal consortia to include arrangements for vertical and 
horizontal cooperation involving municipal governments in both Brazil and Spain. However, in Spanish 
law the term “consortium” (consorcio) is applied to cooperative ventures between different government 
tiers (regional and local, or national and local). For inter-municipal (horizontal) cooperation the legal term 
is “associations” (mancomunidades). See Ferreira (2006) for a survey of the legal basis for inter-municipal 
cooperation in Spain. Hereinafter we use the term consortium to describe both vertical and horizontal 
cooperative ventures. 
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density, also have a bearing on unit provision costs, a finding that is in line with the empirical 
literature for these two countries (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 2005).  
 The causal link between unit provision costs and participation in inter-municipal consortia is 
complex and specific to particular services. High unit provision costs, which suggest that there is 
scope for enhancing cost-effectiveness, are associated with a higher probability of participation in 
inter-municipal consortia for the provision of health care and transport in Brazil. In the case of 
health care, this finding confirms the predictions of a theoretical model developed by Teixeira et 
al. (2003a and 2003b) and Teixeira (2007). But in some cases, such as urban development in 
Brazil and solid waste collection in Spain, high unit provision costs actually discourage local 
governments from participation, while controlling for socio-economic and geographical 
characteristics that might influence the decision to participate.  
 The empirical analysis for Brazil suggests that participation in consortia with higher levels of 
administration and/or private-sector providers is a powerful predictor of the probability of local 
government participation in inter-municipal consortia. Instead, governance arrangements 
involving the federal government appear to substitute for participation in inter-municipal 
consortia, at least in the case of urban development and health care.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons why local governments may 
participate in voluntary governance arrangements for the joint provision of local services. Section 3 
reviews the Brazilian and Spanish experience with inter-municipal consortia. Section 4 elaborates on the 
estimating strategy, presents the data and reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses 
the main findings and highlights their policy implications.               
2 Why do local governments cooperate? 
There are many reasons why local governments may want to cooperate in the production and delivery 
of services under their purview. Country experience suggests that motivation comes primarily from the 
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possibility of reducing unit provision costs, which depends in turn on the scope for gains from economies 
of scale, and for internalising cross-border benefit spillovers within the providing jurisdiction, while at 
same time preserving local self-government (Norton, 1994; Hulst and van Montfort, 2007).  
Maximise economies of scale  
Several services provided by local government are subject to scale effects in production, delivery and 
use. This is especially the case of vertically integrated (often capital-intensive) services that are in fixed 
supply, at least in the short run, such as physical infrastructure and urban amenities. Instead, horizontally 
integrated (often labour-intensive) services, including for example education and health care, use separate 
production units to produce/deliver the same service. As a result, there is an optimal size at which 
individual plants can be used efficiently; increases in population and/or land area simply require more 
production units, which limits the scope for economies of scale.  
The presence of scale effects in local government provision implies that, if local government operate 
at below optimal scale, an increase in size (resident population) would result in lower provision costs in per 
capita terms until optimality is reached. This creates an incentive for local governments to cooperate 
among themselves through the joint provision of services, which would allow them to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale and reduce unit delivery costs.    
Despite theoretical intuition, it is not easy to test empirically for the presence of scale effects in local 
government provision. The public finance literature has favoured the option of gauging the optimal scale of 
provision by using information available from the actual distribution of the resident population among the 
various local jurisdictions (Carey et al., 1996). Recent surveys of the literature, such as Byrnes and Dollery 
(2002), Fox and Gurley (2006), and Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez-Reino (2008), indeed show that scale 
effects are service-specific and most likely for vertically integrated, capital-intensive services, as suggested 
by theory. Horizontally integrated, labour-intensive services, such as education, policing, fire protection 
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and health care, are less likely to benefit from scale effects as the size of the resident population increases 
(Ladd, 1992 and 1994).
3
  
Scale effects are also present in local government provision in Spain. Solé-Ollé and Bosch (2005) 
show the existence of scale economies for municipalities with population under 5 000 inhabitants using 
aggregated data for all services. Bel (2006) report empirical evidence in favour of the existence of scale 
effects for collection, transport and treatment of solid waste in municipalities with population up to 20 000 
inhabitants (50 000 in some Spanish regions, such as Galicia, according to Bel and Fageda, 2010).
4
 
Internalise externality effects  
Local government provision also often generates cross-border externalities. This is the case, for 
example, when the costs of provision are borne by local taxpayers (residents) while the benefits of a 
particular service accrue to non-residents. Benefit spillovers are potentially large when beneficiaries are 
mobile across municipalities, as in the case of recreational and cultural services, and/or when services 
themselves are mobile, as in the case of fire fighting. Because of such cross-border externalities, local 
governments may be discouraged from provision in the first place, unless non-residents can be excluded 
from the service in question and/or local governments reimburse each other for the services delivered to 
their residents by other jurisdictions. In other words, if services are provided at a level of administration 
that is unable to internalise the full benefits of provision, the different supplying jurisdictions would play a 
Nash game that would result in sub-optimal provision. To the extent that sub-optimal provision is 
sanctioned by the electorate, local governments face an incentive to cooperate among themselves to 
provide jointly those services that are most likely to generate cross-border externalities.  
The presence of cross-border externalities in government provision is usually tested by including 
spatial effects in expenditure equations (Anselin and Bera, 1998). This procedure can be computationally 
                                                     
3
  See Andrews et al. (2002) for evidence of economies of scale in education for the United States. 
4
  Moreover, the authors found stronger evidence of scale effects for the municipalities of Galicia than 
elsewhere, a finding that they attribute to weaker inter-municipal cooperation among the smaller Galician 
municipalities. 
 Local Government Cooperation for Joint Provision 7 
 
 
cumbersome, because it requires the definition of a matrix of jurisdictional weights, based for example on 
inter-municipal travel distances, from which geographical proximity can be gauged. Alternatively, a less 
computationally demanding strategy consists of identifying those municipalities in the sample that are 
located in large urban areas and/or metropolitan regions, where spatial effects are likely to be strongest due 
to close geographical proximity and high population density. This strategy will be pursued in the 
estimations reported below, because the samples of Brazilian and Spanish municipalities are large. 
In the case of Spain, Solé-Ollé (2001) confirms the existence of cross-borders externalities for urban 
security, culture and sports, welfare, housing and urban planning in a sample of municipalities of the 
province of Barcelona. Per capita expenditure in each jurisdiction depends on the level of expenditure in 
neighbouring jurisdictions. These results have been extended by Solé-Ollé (2006) for a larger sample of 
Spanish municipalities. Recent results by Bastida et al. (2010) for all Spanish municipalities with over 
1 000 inhabitants show that there are positive and significant interactions between neighbouring 
municipalities: the spending of a municipality is positively correlated with its neighbouring municipalities’ 
spending. The empirical findings hold for total municipal expenditure and for six different expenditure 
categories: solid waste, water supply, housing, civil protection, education and culture.      
Other motives 
Local governments may face the incentive to cooperate as a means of securing advantageous 
conditions in procurement. Governments are large purchasers of goods and services and as a result may 
influence markets by enjoying monopsony powers. To the extent that suppliers enjoy economies of scale in 
production, they may also benefit from large purchases and joint procurement by local governments. At the 
same time, joint provision may allow service providers to gain from the standardisation of services, which 
improves cost-efficiency. It is nevertheless difficult to measure empirically the scope for cost-efficiency 
gains in government procurement, and evidence tends to be essentially anecdotal. In particular, it is also 
difficult to establish whether gains associated with joint procurement is due to better market conditions or 
economies of scale in procurement and/or supply.  
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Inter-municipal cooperation may also allow local governments greater administrative flexibility. This 
is the case of governance arrangements that offer greater flexibility in personnel management than the 
often stricter regulations governing public sector employment. Comparative analysis of different 
governance arrangements is uncommon, but Bel and Fageda (2006) and Bel, Fageda and Mur (2010) find 
that small Spanish municipalities (with population under 20 000 inhabitants) use inter-municipal 
cooperation as an alternative to privatisation in the cases of solid waste collection and water distribution. 
While both governance arrangements go in the direction of facilitating the exploitation of economies of 
scale, small municipalities usually face higher transactions costs than private-sector providers and capacity 
constraints to deal with private-sector partners, when the service is not produced by the providing 
municipality.
5
  
 3 Inter-municipal cooperation in Brazil and Spain 
Brazilian and Spanish municipalities have a fairly long tradition of joint provision and financing 
through inter-municipal consortia. In both countries, consortia are most often single-purpose entities 
dedicated to the provision of services and maintenance of urban infrastructure; consortia are seldom 
established with the primary objective of performing policy coordination and planning tasks. Consortia are 
usually set up on a voluntary basis, often as non-profit organisations, and the legal/institutional framework 
for their establishment is provided for by local government legislation. Municipalities also often engage in 
joint ventures with higher levels of administration, such as the middle-tier jurisdictions (states in Brazil and 
comunidades autónomas in Spain) and the central government, as well as private-sector providers.  
In Brazil, experience with inter-municipal consortia is most developed in the case of health care. 
Nearly 41% of the municipalities with population above 5 000 inhabitants participated in such consortia in 
2009,
6
 against just over 16% in the case of urban planning and development, about 11.5% in the case of 
                                                     
5
  See also Warner (2007) for more discussion. 
6
  Several consortia were put in place in the 1980s ahead of, and in preparation for, the establishment of a 
unified national health care system (SUS, Sistema Único de Saúde) and the devolution of responsibility for 
the provision of health care to the municipalities, which took place gradually in the early to mid-1990s. The 
decentralisation of health care provision placed a burden on the smaller municipalities, which lacked the 
scale, the administrative and technical capacity, and the financial means to deliver the range of services to 
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education and about 4% in the case of transport (IBGE, 2009). In Spain, nearly one-half of the 
municipalities with population above 5 000 inhabitants participated in consortia for solid waste collection, 
against one-third for waste water treatment, some 27% for the provision of social services,
7
 and about 18% 
for transport.  
A small but rich literature has emerged about the Brazilian experience with inter-municipal health 
care consortia. Teixeira et al. (2003a and 2003b) and Teixeira (2007) developed a dynamic two-period 
game and found that technological parameters, such as scale effects in production and service delivery, as 
well as the scope for improvements in the quality of services, including through access by residents to a 
broader array of services, which are rewarded in the electoral process, provide strong incentives for local 
(elected) policymakers to participate. The probability of participation also depends on local income and 
preferences, which affect the level of spending on health care and the tax rate needed to finance service 
delivery, once a consortium is established. 
4 Estimation and main findings 
The estimating strategy and data 
The drivers of local government participation in inter-municipal consortia discussed above – scale 
effects, cross-border spillovers, geographical and socio-economic conditions, etc. – are also likely to affect 
unit provision costs directly. The link between unit provision costs and the probability of participation is 
therefore subject to reverse causality, which would bias the parameter estimates, unless it is addressed 
appropriately. In particular, high unit provision costs may encourage participation in consortia, and 
participation may drive such costs down. This hypothesis can be tested by estimating an instrumental-
variable probit model as follows:    
                                                                                                                                                                             
be devolved to them, especially in specialised, in-patient care. See Teixeira (2007) for more information on 
the legal and institutional framework for the establishment of inter-municipal health care consortia. 
7
  The social services provided by the Spanish municipalities include general services agreed with the 
comunidades autónomas, old-age care, home care (SAD), and support for the disabled, immigrants and 
minorities, amonh other services. See Villalta (2011) and Tranchez (2011) for more information. 
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*
iP  is a latent variable measuring the probability that municipality i participates in an inter-
municipal consortium, with )0(1 iP , if )0(0
* iP ; 
k
iS  is per capita local government spending on 
programme k, which proxies for the unit cost of providing the service; )( ij N  is a spline function of the 
resident population ( iN ) of municipality i defining 1n  population brackets, which allows for testing for 
the presence of scale effects in provision; iC  is an indicator of local government centrality, which allows 
for testing for the presence of cross-border spillover effects in provision; 
P
iZ  and 
S
iZ  are vectors of 
controls; and  iu  and ie  are error terms, which are assumed to be distributed as )1,0(~iu  and )1,0(~ie .  
Unit provision costs are proxied by per capita government spending. The main variables of interest 
are the resident population, which allows for testing for the presence of scale effects in local provision, and 
an indicator of municipal “centrality” that identifies those municipalities that belong to a metropolitan area 
to test for the presence of cross-border externalities associated with the provision of municipal services. A 
piece-wise linear specification is used to test for the presence of scale effects, and the distribution of 
population among the municipalities is used to set the knots of the spline function at the 25
th
, 50
th
 and the 
75
th
 percentiles of the distribution. The coefficients of the spline function are defined as changes in slope 
from the previous population bracket. Negatively signed coefficients suggest the presence of scale effects 
in municipal provision. As for the centrality indicator, a positive coefficient is indicative of the presence of 
cross-border externality effects in those municipalities located in large metropolitan areas and urban 
sprawls.   
The set of control variables includes population density and urbanisation. The net effect of population 
density and urbanisation on unit provision costs depends on the nature of the services provided. In the case 
of capital-intensive services, unit provision costs may increase in densely populated urban areas due to 
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engineering and technical difficulties associated with the construction and upgrading of urban 
infrastructure and amenities. By contrast, such costs may fall with population density in the case of 
services whose delivery benefits from agglomeration effects, such as specialised in-patient care and higher 
levels of education. Relative income is included in the set of covariates to control for socio-economic 
factors, which affect the demand for local services. Per capita municipal spending is likely to be higher in 
richer jurisdictions, which can afford to provide a broader and/or more sophisticated array of possibly 
costlier services demanded by residents. Controls for the ability of local governments to deliver goods and 
services include the average municipal tax rate and per capita intergovernmental transfers received by the 
municipalities from higher levels of government.  
As for the determinants of participation in inter-governmental consortia, the main variable of interest 
is the unit cost of municipal provision. In addition, the theoretical literature pioneered by Teixeira et al. 
(2003a and 2003b) and Teixeira (2007) for Brazilian health care consortia offers some guidance on the 
choice of control variables. Local preferences and income, which affect the incentives facing 
municipalities to participate in consortia, are proxied by population density, the urbanisation ratio, the 
human capital indicator (unemployment rate in the case of Spain) and per capita municipal income relative 
to the national average. The centrality indicator is included in the regressions to proxy for the incentives 
for participation arising from the presence of cross-border externalities. The local tax ratio and 
intergovernmental transfers capture the availability of finance for the delivery of health care, which are 
also found to affect the incentives facing local policymakers to participate. Dummy variables identifying 
participation in joint ventures with higher levels of administration and with private-sector providers are 
also included in the set of controls in the case of Brazil, because they may affect the incentives facing 
municipalities to establish inter-municipal consortia. 
Data are available primarily from Brazilian and Spanish sources, and the variables of interest are 
defined in Appendix Table 1.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
1 
  Mean Median St. dev. No. obs. 
  Brazil 
Spending (per capita, 2000-05 average, R$2005) 
    Total 616.8 555.7 312.1 4061 
Health care/sanitation 152.9 135.7 84.3 4061 
Education/culture 230.6 214.2 98.4 4061 
Administration/planning 130.3 109.8 91.8 4027 
Transport 36.3 22.3 42.8 4061 
Population (thousands, 2000) 39.4 14.5 208.0 4098 
Density (inhabitants per sq. km, 2000) 122.8 28.4 608.7 4098 
Urbanisation ratio (%, 2000) 3300.6 482.0 65780.2 4042 
Relative income (per capita, % of national average, 2000) 100.0 88.1 60.3 4098 
Human capital (% of national average, 2000) 148.0 37.1 1075.0 4098 
Intergovernmental transfers (per capita, 2000-05 average, R$2005) 679.7 627.2 303.8 4061 
Average tax rate (per capita, 2000-05 average, R$2005) 53.2 28.1 81.0 4061 
  
Spain 
Spending (per capita, 2009, current euros) 
    
Total 1158.2 1103.4 612.0 1296 
Waste collection 47.9 32.6 55.2 1033 
Waste water treatment 82.9 67.9 165.3 1161 
Social programmes 111.0 102.4 69.0 1188 
Transport 12.4 5.4 20.4 474 
Population (thousands, 2009) 31.2 11.7 115.2 1295 
Density (inhabitants per sq. km, 2009) 825.3 257.6 1877.3 1295 
Urbanisation ratio (%, 2009) 1683.2 72.1 15069.3 1291 
Relative income (per capita, % of national average, 2008) 100.0 81.0 83.7 1292 
Unemployment rate (%, 2009) 7.7 7.4 2.5 1292 
Intergovernmental transfers (total, per capita, 2009, current euros) 594.2 548.5 537.0 1298 
Average tax rate (per capita, 2009, current euros) 534.1 476.0 571.1 1298 
1. See Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the variables and data sources. 
Source: IPEA, INE, and authors’ calculations. 
Baseline results 
Unit delivery costs 
 The results of the estimations of the first-stage probit regressions, reported in Table 2 for Brazil and 
Table 3 for Spain, do not suggest that there are strong scale effects in local government provision in Spain 
or Brazil when unit provision costs are defined for total municipal expenditure. At a more disaggregated 
level, however, the relationship between population size and unit provision costs is not uniform across 
services, at least as far as the experience of Brazil is concerned. There appears to be scale effects in 
 Local Government Cooperation for Joint Provision 13 
 
 
administration and planning in Brazil, although the effects do not seem to vary in a statistically discernible 
manner across population brackets, and transport. In the case of education/culture, unit provision costs rise 
with population, albeit by a lower proportion in larger jurisdictions, as expected for horizontally integrated 
services. This is also the case of transport in Spain, where unit delivery costs appear to be higher in larger 
jurisdictions, reflecting to some extent the fact that urban passenger transport is a compulsory expenditure 
item in municipalities with population above 50 000 inhabitants. 
Urban centrality, which proxies for the presence of cross-border externalities in local provision, 
appears to be associated with higher unit provision costs for transport services in Brazil and Spain, while 
controlling for population density and other effects that may influence the cost of provision in large urban 
areas. In the case of health care, unit delivery costs are lower, not higher, in those Brazilian municipalities 
located in metropolitan areas. This finding could be related to the fact that services are often provided by 
higher levels of administration, such as the states and the federal government, in addition to the 
municipalities themselves, in the case of more specialised in-patient care, which tend to be provided in 
metropolitan areas and larger urban centres.  
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Table 2. Expenditure groups: First-stage probit regressions, Brazil
1
 
(Dep. Variable: Municipal spending per capita) 
  Total outlays 
Health 
care/sanitation 
Education/cultur
e  
Administration/
planning 
Transport 
Population (lowest quartile) 0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.48 *** -0.14 * -1.39 *** 
  (0.027) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.266) 
 Population (second quartile) 0.04 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.08 * 0.00 
 
1.12 *** 
  (0.033) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.327) 
 Population (third quartile) 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.07 * 0.03 
 
-0.82 *** 
  (0.026) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.253) 
 Population (top quartile) 0.01 
 
0.15 *** -0.10 *** 0.06 
 
0.60 *** 
  (0.016) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.153) 
 Urban centrality 0.01 
 
-0.05 *** -0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.12 * 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.071) 
 Population density 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.13 *** 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.018) 
 
Urbanisation ratio 0.01 *** 0.03 *** -0.01 * 0.01 
 
-0.34 *** 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.023) 
 Relative income 0.06 *** -0.03 ** -0.04 *** 0.00 
 
0.82 *** 
  (0.007) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.070) 
 Human capital -0.04 ** 0.07 
 
-0.36 *** 0.08 
 
0.45 ** 
  (0.018) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.174) 
 Intergovernmental transfers 0.95 *** 0.93 *** 0.95 *** 0.91 *** 0.60 *** 
  (0.009) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.090) 
 
Average tax rate 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.11 *** 0.17 *** 
  (0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.037) 
 Partipation in state consortia 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.06 ** 0.16 
   (0.007) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.104) 
 Participation in federal consortia 0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.12 
   (0.008) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.141) 
 Private sector partnership 
arrangement -0.01 ** -0.01 
 
0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
0.18 ** 
  (0.005) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.092) 
 Other arrangement with private 
sector 0.00 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 * 0.01 
 
0.47 *** 
  (0.008) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.178) 
 No. of observations 3758   3757   3758   3725   3631   
Adj. R-sq. 0.88   0.58   0.63   0.50   0.33   
1. The results refer to the first-step estimations of the probit models and include an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in logarithmic form. The sample includes municipalities with population above 5 000 
inhabitants. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is denoted by respectively (***), (**) and (*).   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 3. Expenditure groups: First-stage probit regressions, Spain
1
 
(Dep. Variable: Municipal spending per capita) 
  
Total 
outlays 
Waste 
collection 
Waste water 
treatment 
Social 
programmes 
Transport   
Population (lowest quartile) 0.08 
 
0.27 
 
-0.19 
 
0.30 
 
2.96 * 
   (0.081) (0.360) 
 
(0.682) 
 
(0.387) 
 
(1.788) 
  Population (second quartile) 0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
0.40 
 
-0.49 
 
-4.08 
    (0.119) (0.528) 
 
(1.004) 
 
(0.567) 
 
(2.610) 
  Population (third quartile) -0.14 * -0.01 
 
-0.59 
 
0.30 
 
0.97 
    (0.081) (0.354) 
 
(0.686) 
 
(0.386) 
 
(1.542) 
  Population (top quartile) 0.07 
 
-0.09 
 
0.39 
 
-0.14 
 
0.98 
    (0.045) (0.198) 
 
(0.389) 
 
(0.217) 
 
(0.720) 
  Urban centrality 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.06 
 
0.07 
 
0.70 ** 
 
 
(0.016) (0.073) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.293) 
  Population density 0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.14 ** 0.02 
 
-0.21 * 
   (0.007) (0.029) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.111) 
  
Urbanisation ratio -0.01 
 
0.08 *** 0.06 
 
-0.02 
 
0.07 
    (0.005) (0.021) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.079) 
  Relative income 0.02 * -0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.11 
    (0.011) (0.051) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.204) 
  Unemployment rate -0.04 ** -0.43 *** 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.19 
    (0.020) (0.087) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.338) 
  Intergovernmental transfers 0.70 *** -0.20 *** -0.04 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.47 * 
   (0.014) (0.065) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.267) 
  
Average tax rate 0.44 *** 0.45 *** 0.27 ** 0.24 *** 0.61 *** 
   (0.014) (0.059) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.215) 
  No. of observations 1290   1136   1046   1190   393     
Adj. R-sq. 0.86   0.20   0.01   0.02   0.16     
1. The results refer to the first-step estimations of the probit models and include an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All variables are defined in logarithmic form. The sample includes municipalities with population above 5 000 
inhabitants. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is denoted by respectively (***), (**) and (*).   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
As for the other covariates, the empirical evidence is mixed for population density, which in Brazil is 
associated with higher unit provision costs in the case of social spending (education/culture and health 
care/sanitation) and lower costs in the case of administration/planning and transport. In Spain, unit 
transport costs are also lower in more densely populated municipalities. Evidence is somewhat mixed for 
urbanisation, which tends to reduce the unit provision costs of some services in Brazil, such as transport 
and education/culture, while increasing such costs in the case of health care/sanitation. In Spain, unit 
provision costs are higher for waste collection in more urbanised jurisdictions. Relative income also 
matters, and unit provision costs are higher in relatively richer jurisdictions in both Brazil and Spain, while 
in Brazil the effect varies across services. The effect of affordability is unequivocal in both countries: local 
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revenue mobilisation is associated with higher spending per capita, although Brazilian municipalities 
appear to be more dependent on intergovernmental transfers than their Spanish counterparts.  
Data limitations prevent the analysis of whether or not participation in consortia with higher levels of 
administration and/or with the private sector affects unit delivery costs in Spain. But, as far as the Brazilian 
experience is concerned, all else equal, participation in consortia with the states appears to increase unit 
provision costs in the case of administration and planning, and cooperation with private-sector providers 
tends to increase unit provision costs for both education/culture and transport. 
The results are overall fairly robust to re-estimating the regressions for a sample that includes smaller 
municipalities. There is somewhat stronger evidence in support of the hypothesis of scale effects in local 
government provision in the case of Brazil if municipalities with less than 5 000 inhabitants are included in 
the sample, but this is not the case of Spain, where the results are robust to the inclusion of smaller 
municipalities in the sample (with population above 2 000 inhabitants). The results for Spain are also fairly 
robust to restricting the sample to the municipalities of Castilla-La Mancha and Castilla-León, the two 
autonomous communities where the use of consortia is most widespread and the arrangements for inter-
municipal cooperation are more homogenous.  
Participation in inter-municipal consortia 
 The results of the estimation of the second-stage probit regressions are reported in Table 4 for Brazil 
and in Table 5 for Spain. High unit provision costs are associated with a higher probability of participation 
in inter-municipal consortia for the provision of health care and transport in Brazil. In other cases, such as 
education, the probability of participation does not seem to be affected by unit provision costs in Brazil. 
The unit cost of provision does not seem to provide a strong incentive for participation in Spain, which 
depends on the level of unemployment and dependence on intergovernmental transfers in nearly all 
services under examination. Higher-tax Spanish jurisdictions are less likely to participate in consortia, 
which can be attributed to affordability, which weakens the incentive a jurisdiction may face for joint 
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provision. In the case of waste collection, higher unit provision costs seem to reduce, rather than increase, 
the probability of participation.  
In the case of Brazil the probability of local government participation in inter-municipal consortia is 
strongly affected by participation in consortia with higher tiers of government and/or private-sector 
providers. Those municipalities that are engaged in cooperative arrangements with the state governments 
and with private-sector providers are more likely to participate in inter-municipal consortia than those that 
do not. Instead, governance arrangements involving the federal government appear to substitute for 
participation in inter-municipal consortia, at least in the case of urban development and health care.  
Table 4. Expenditure groups: Second-stage probit regressions, Brazil
1 
(Dep. Variable: Participation in inter-municipal consortia) 
  Health care Education 
Urban 
development 
Transport 
Unit delivery cost 0.23 *** 0.11 
 
-3.64 ** 0.13 *** 
  (0.083) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(1.421) 
 
(0.042) 
 Population density 0.07 *** -0.06 ** -0.10 *** -0.13 *** 
  (0.020) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.034) 
 Urbanisation ratio -0.12 *** -0.07 ** 0.05 
 
0.00 
   (0.025) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.048) 
 Relative income 0.84 *** 0.10 
 
0.29 *** -0.01 
   (0.064) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.120) 
 Human capital -0.38 *** 0.13 *** 0.04 
 
0.02 
   (0.037) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.066) 
 Intergovernmental transfers -0.61 *** 0.00 
 
3.56 *** -0.47 ** 
  (0.125) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(1.329) 
 
(0.191) 
 
Average tax rate 0.17 *** -0.05 
 
0.36 ** 0.06 
   (0.043) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.076) 
 
Partipation in state consortia 0.36 *** 0.39 *** 0.78 *** 0.61 *** 
  (0.077) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.156) 
 Participation in federal consortia -0.29 *** 0.05 
 
-0.51 *** -0.22 
   (0.089) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.250) 
 Private sector partnership arrangement 0.15 *** 0.23 *** 0.55 *** 0.42 *** 
  (0.053) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.145) 
 
Other arrangement with private sector 0.16 * 0.42 *** 0.50 *** 0.77 *** 
  (0.090) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.232) 
 No. of observations 3757   3758   3725   3631   
Wald test (prob > chi-sq) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Wald test for exogeneity (prob > chi-sq) ..   ..   0.00   ..   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.12   0.05   ..   0.07   
1. The models are estimated by probit with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and include an intercept (not reported). 
Where evidence of endogeneity is found, government expenditure is instrumented by the resident population (spline with 
knots at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the distribution), the centrality dummy and the other independent variables. 
All variables are defined in logarithmic form. Sample includes municipalities with population above 5 000 inhabitants. 
Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is denoted by respectively (***), (**) and (*).   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 5. Expenditure groups: Second-stage probit regressions, Spain
1
 
(Dep. Variable: Participation in inter-municipal consortia) 
  Waste collection 
Waste water 
treatment 
Social 
programmes 
Transport 
Unit delivery cost -0.93 *** 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
   (0.312) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.039) 
 Population density 0.07 
 
0.07 * -0.11 *** 0.11 
   (0.046) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.082) 
 Urbanisation ratio 0.06 
 
-0.07 * -0.01 
 
0.06 
   (0.044) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.062) 
 Relative income -0.08 
 
0.04 
 
-0.14 * 0.05 
   (0.084) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.153) 
 Unemployment rate 0.01 
 
0.98 *** 0.59 *** 0.90 *** 
  (0.170) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.263) 
 Intergovernmental transfers 0.01 
 
0.30 *** 0.25 ** 0.42 * 
  (0.131) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.214) 
 
Average tax rate 0.18 
 
-0.20 ** -0.18 * -0.34 * 
  (0.181) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.176) 
 No. of observations 1136   1046   1190   393   
Wald test (prob > chi-sq) 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Wald test for exogeneity (prob > chi-sq) 0.01   ..   ..   ..   
Pseudo R-sq. ..   0.06   0.05   0.08   
1. The results refer to the second-step estimation of the probit models and include an intercept (not reported). Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Where evidence of endogeneity is found, government expenditure is instrumented by 
the resident population (spline with knots at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the distribution), the metropolitan area 
dummy and the other independent variables. All variables are defined in logarithmic form. The sample includes 
municipalities with population above 5 000 inhabitants. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is denoted 
by respectively (***), (**) and (*).   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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5 Discussion and policy considerations 
The empirical findings reported above suggest that the provision of at least some local services 
exhibits scale and spatial spillover effects in both Brazil and Spain. The socio-economic characteristics of 
local communities, as well as population density, also have a bearing on unit provision costs, a finding that 
is in line with the empirical literature, and in particular for these two countries (Solé-Ollé and Bosch, 
2005). High unit provision costs, which suggest that there is scope for enhancing cost-effectiveness, are 
associated with a higher probability of participation in inter-municipal consortia for the provision of health 
care and transport in Brazil. But in some cases, such as urban development in Brazil and waste collection 
in Spain, high unit provision costs actually discourages local governments from participation, while 
controlling for socio-economic and geographical characteristics that might influence the decision to 
participate.  
The empirical analysis for Brazil suggests that participation in consortia with higher tiers of 
government and/or private-sector providers is a powerful predictor of the probability of local government 
participation in inter-municipal consortia. The probit model results show that the municipalities that are 
engaged in consortia with the state governments and with private-sector providers are more likely to 
participate in inter-municipal consortia than those that do not, suggesting that there may be some 
“participation spillovers”, which are not often taken into account in empirical analysis. Instead, governance 
arrangements involving the federal government appear to substitute for participation in inter-municipal 
consortia, at least in the case of urban development and health care. This finding indicates that horizontal 
arrangements among peers may well foster the development of “policy networks” at the local. By contrast, 
vertical arrangements involving the municipalities and the federal government may curtail the development 
of inter-municipal consortia.  
Data limitations prevented us from testing whether or not vertical governance arrangements affect 
participation in inter-municipal consortia in Spain. But review of the experience of several European 
countries by Hulst and van Montfort (2007) is instructive. The authors show that governance arrangements 
20 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
comprising local governments and public authorities of higher levels of administration tend to be avoided 
rather than encouraged in countries such as Belgium, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. To some 
extent, this is precisely to prevent involvement of higher levels of government from curtailing the 
development of bottom-up initiatives that could result in innovative solutions to common challenges. By 
contrast, mixed arrangements dominate in the United Kingdom and have been encouraged through central 
government efforts to improve the performance of local government. 
These empirical findings reported above suggest that flexible arrangements for the joint provision of 
local services, such as inter-municipal consortia, may be important tools for local governments to improve 
the cost-effectiveness of provision while satisfying demands for local autonomy. Joint provision allows 
local governments to maximise scale effects in production and service delivery, internalise benefit 
spillovers and seek advantageous conditions in procurement, among other benefits, which are likely to 
exert downward pressure on unit delivery costs. It is true that such benefits could also potentially arise 
from the consolidation of local governments into larger units through mergers and amalgamations, for 
example, but international experience shows that in many cases there is considerable political and public 
opinion resistance to consolidation (Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez-Reino, 2008). In addition, the benefits 
of proximity between the government and the citizenry, which has much scope for making the government 
more responsive to local preferences and needs and for strengthening social control over government 
operations, would also likely be lost through consolidations. Weighing the benefits and costs of alternative 
governance arrangements is of course an empirical question, but institutional arrangements change only 
slowing and the structure of local governments, while far from immutable, are not often amenable to 
experimentation.
8
   
        
                                                     
8
  For some recent empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of consolidation, see Steiner (2003) for 
Germany, Sorensen (2006) and Dafflon and Ruegg (2001) for Switzerland. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definition and sources 
Municipal spending per capita Per capita spending includes capital and current outlays. For Brazil, expenditure 
is disaggregated for transport, education and culture, health care and sanitation, 
and administration and planning. Budgetary data (available from IPEA) were first 
deflated by the GDP deflator (available from IPEA) and defined in reais of 2005. 
For Spain expenditure is disaggregated for waste collection, waste water 
treatment, social programmes and transport. Expenditure data are defined in 
current euros and available from the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance.  
Population Resident population available from IPEA for Brazil and INE for Spain. 
Population density Municipal population divided by the municipality’s land area. Available from IPEA 
for Brazil and INE for Spain.   
Urbanisation ratio Constructed as the ratio (times 100) of the urban to rural residential capital 
stocks (available from IPEA for Brazil and from Catastro for Spain 
(http://www.catastro.meh.es/esp/estadistica/estadisticas2.asp#menu1) 
Relative income Average income is defined for Brazil as per capita household income (available 
from IPEA) in per cent of the national average and for Spain as the per capita 
economic activity indicator estimated by La Caixa in per cent of the national 
average. ( http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com)  
Human capital Available for Brazil only and constructed as the ratio of the difference in 
expected earnings between educated and non-educated individuals (available 
from IPEA) to the national average. 
Unemployment rate Registered unemployment over total population expressed in percentage. 
Available from La Caixa ( http://www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com) 
Intergovernmental transfers For Brazil, intergovernmental transfers received by the municipality (available 
from IPEA) are deflated by the GDP deflator and defined in reais of 2005 and 
then divided by the municipal population. For Spain, data are available in current 
euros for 2009 from the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance. 
Average tax rate Municipal revenue from tax and non-tax instruments. For Brazil, revenue is 
deflated by the GDP deflator (available from IPEA) and defined in reais of 2005 
and then divided by the municipal population (available from IPEA). For Spain, 
data are available in current euros for 2009 from the Ministry of Economy and 
Public Finance.  
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Urban centrality Dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the municipality is located in a 
metropolitan area and “0” otherwise. For Brazil, metropolitan areas include the 
metropolitan regions and urban agglomerations reported by IBGE. For 
Spain,data on urban areas is provided from AUDES 
(http://alarcos.esi.uclm.es/per/fruiz/audes/index.htm)  
Participation in inter-municipal 
consortia 
Dummy variable taking the value of “1” if the municipality participates in a 
consortium, and “0” otherwise. Data for Spain is from the Ministry of territorial 
organization and public administration 
(http://ssweb.mpt.es/REL/frontend/inicio/mancomunidades). 
 
 
